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outlined in SPECTRUM can influence the type of incentive mechanism that is considered most 
appropriate for any given mobile crowdsensing initiative. 
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With rapid growth in mobile technologies, smart devices such as mobile phones, smart 
vehicles and wearables are fast becoming powerful sensing units used at a societal scale 
for monitoring the surrounding environment and for understanding complex urban and 
community dynamics [1]. These devices come equipped with a broad range of sophisti-
cated embedded sensors such as an accelerometer, gyroscope, GNSS, digital compass, 
GPS, microphone, light intensity sensor and camera [2]. The phenomenal growth in 
the richness and diversity of sensors on smart devices [3], combined with the inherent 
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mobility of mobile device users provide a unique opportunity to harvest large-scale sens-
ing data with fine-grained spatio-temporal coverage [1, 4]. The process for doing this is 
commonly referred to as mobile crowdsensing, a socio-technical concept facilitated by a 
growing number of software applications that are fast becoming indispensable tools for 
active urban intervention [1].
Mobile crowdsensing can be formally defined as a large-scale sensing paradigm in 
which spatially distributed participants with sensing and computing devices capture and 
collectively share data in order to measure and map phenomena of common interest [3]. 
Unlike the traditional static infrastructure-based sensing method, mobile crowdsens-
ing does not require the deployment of expensive fixed infrastructure assets, potentially 
making it a cheaper solution [1]. Basically, the key drivers of mobile crowdsensing are 
the ubiquitous mobile device users, whose geographical distribution allows for an exten-
sive acquisition of spatially-oriented data in a scale that steers various smart-city appli-
cations [1].
Applications of mobile crowdsensing cut across a wide range of areas that are critical 
for sustainable urban development and for improvement to quality of life for citizens, in 
terms of convenience, comfort, safety and security [1]. Typical application areas include 
environment monitoring, community healthcare, surveys with embedded geotagged 
photos [5], traffic monitoring and transportation planning, garbage classification, infra-
structure management, disaster management, public safety and so on [1, 6, 7]. With the 
recent surge in the application of these socio-technical systems in city management, 
mobile crowdsensing has been recognised as an important technological enabler for 
smart cities [1]. In this sense, successful societies are increasingly incorporating data and 
insight from mobile crowdsensing solutions into their planning process, decision mak-
ing and policy formation activities [1]. Consequently, this burgeoning phenomenon has 
attracted significant attention from major industry players and academic research com-
munities, seeking to address the key challenges militating against widespread use and 
adoption of mobile crowdsensing systems [1].
One of the key challenges that must be adequately tackled in order to harness the full 
potential of mobile crowdsensing is the issue of how to identify the most appropriate 
incentive scheme for sufficiently motivating individuals to participate in large-scale sens-
ing campaigns [8]. For any crowdsensing initiative to be successful, an efficient incentive 
mechanism is required to adequately compensate participants for the time, effort and 
resources invested in the process of capturing, processing and transmitting sensed data 
[9]. Typically, different sensing tasks will cause each participant to incur varying level of 
direct and indirect costs arising from the use of network bandwidth, memory, CPU, bat-
tery usage, personal time, travel and special skills [10]. Hence, without strong incentives 
to meet the varying expectations of different participants, the problem of poor motiva-
tion and unwillingness of individuals to participate in the crowdsensing process abounds 
[1].
Several incentive mechanisms (e.g. [11–16]) have been proposed to address this prob-
lem, many of which are designed to suit the crowdsensing context and specific require-
ments of the underlying sensing initiative. Despite the proliferation of these technical 
solutions, Restuccia et  al. [17] draw attention to the fact that it is yet unclear what is 
the most appropriate incentive to adopt in motivating users to participate in mobile 
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crowdsensing. As a first step towards simplifying the process of identifying suitable 
incentives, several studies (e.g. [17–20]) have surveyed existing incentive mechanisms 
in the literature. While these studies report valuable and significant contributions, they 
have not explicitly provided a comprehensive guide that can be useful in inferring the 
most appropriate type of incentive for any given crowdsensing initiative. Hence, this 
paper synthesises relevant literature, with the primary focus of inferring a broad range 
of factors that can influence and therefore guide the decision to adopt an appropriate 
incentive mechanism for any given mobile crowdsensing initiative.
Contributions
Drawing primarily on the literature on incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing, 
this study contributes to the body of knowledge on how to effectively incentivise citizens 
to participate in large scale crowdsensing in the following ways:
  • The paper reviews over 130 relevant articles and presents a comprehensive view of 
mobile crowdsensing, its various types, and the different kinds of incentive mecha-
nisms that nurture the crowdsensing experience. It clearly differentiates between the 
concepts of crowdsensing and crowdsourcing, which are sometimes misused inter-
changeably in the literature.
  • Based on synthesis of literature, the concept of “SPECTRUM” is proposed to shape 
thoughts and guide decision making relevant to the selection of an appropriate 
incentive scheme for any given crowdsensing initiative. More specifically, a broad 
SPECTRUM of factors is presented that covers the various aspects which should 
be considered when adopting incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing ini-
tiatives. Although an attempt is made to report on the appropriateness of different 
incentive mechanisms as influenced by the factors outlined in SPECTRUM, the over-
all goal is not to be strictly prescriptive in recommending various incentives for spe-
cific purposes.
  • An exemplary discussion of a case study is presented to show how a combination of 
factors outlined in SPECTRUM could influence the choice of incentive used in real-
world mobile crowdsensing applications.
  • The paper lays the groundwork and motivation for empirical investigation into how 
different factors outlined in SPECTRUM may influence the type of incentive mecha-
nism adopted for mobile crowdsensing.
  • The paper also discusses and highlights research challenges and areas where further 
studies relevant to the different factors outlined in the concept of SPECTRUM are 
needed to improve citizen participation in mobile crowdsensing.
  • In terms of contribution to practice, it is envisaged that the wide range of factors cov-
ered in SPECTRUM will enable smart cities to broaden the opportunities of adopting 
the most appropriate incentive mechanism in order to effectively incentivise users 
and improve participation in large-scale crowdsensing applications.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the next section presents the 
various types of mobile crowdsensing activities currently being practised, followed by 
“Types of incentive mechanisms” section which then summaries the different types of 
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incentive mechanisms that nurture the crowdsensing experience. In “Conceptual frame-
work” section, the concept of SPECTRUM is proposed based on synthesis of literature 
and used in “Adoption of incentive mechanisms in real-world mobile crowdsensing 
applications” section to show how a combination of factors could influence the choice of 
incentive used in real-world mobile crowdsensing applications, including an exemplary 
discussion of a case study. “Discussions” section further discusses the practical implica-
tions, research opportunities and challenges. Finally, “Conclusion” section concludes the 
paper and makes suggestion for future research.
Types of mobile crowdsensing
Before differentiating between the various types of mobile crowdsensing activities, it 
is important to first provide clarity to avoid ambiguity in the use of the terms crowd-
sensing and crowdsourcing. In crowdsourcing, a top-down approach is adopted and the 
aim is to source the solution to a complex problem by splitting it into smaller tasks that 
can be executed by individual members of the public [10, 21]. Often times, the crowd-
sourcer has an idea of what to expect and the geographical location of participants is not 
a barrier. Whereas in crowdsensing, a bottom-up approach is adopted and the aim is to 
understand or sense a complex problem of interest by splitting the responsibility of har-
vesting relevant information to the crowd and then aggregating the results to obtain an 
emergent outlook of the phenomenon [10, 21]. In the case of crowdsensing, geograph-
ical location of participants is critical and there is often no knowledge about what to 
expect, hence the need for sensing to obtain an output that approximates the opinion of 
the whole crowd [10].
In broad terms, crowdsensing can be divided into three main categories namely group, 
community, and urban sensing (see Fig. 1). Group sensing occurs when an ad hoc group 
formed loosely and opportunistically (e.g., spatially nearby phones) collaboratively con-
tribute sensed data to address a localised shared problem [1]. A typical example is Sig-
nalGuru, a crowdsensing solution that enables vehicles passing through an intersection 
to sense and share the traffic signal information and adjust their driving speed accord-
ingly [22]. Community sensing occurs when the participants in the crowdsensing tasks 
come from a strongly bonded community, with established social ties and trust amongst 
members [1, 23]. The output of community sensing is usually of very high quality as par-
ticipants are more committed towards contributing to solving a common problem of 
interest to the community [1, 23]. Urban sensing on the other hand is a broader crowd-
sensing campaign targeting participants at city-scale level to contribute data from the 
urban landscape [1, 24]. In this case, any citizen can participate, including strangers and 
visitors who may not have vested interest in the phenomenon of concern [1]. Hence, the 
quality of output is usually not as good as those obtained in group or community sens-
ing, and the presence of fake data is also eminent [1].
Based on the awareness and degree to which the custodians of sensing devices are 
involved in the architecture, each of these three types of mobile crowdsensing, i.e., 
group, community, and urban sensing, can be further subdivided into opportunistic sens-
ing and participatory sensing. Opportunistic sensing is a mobile crowdsensing paradigm, 
wherein mobile devices are automatically used to sense data without users’ knowledge 
or explicit action [25]. In opportunistic sensing, user involvement is minimal and the 
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mobile device itself makes decisions according to the sensed and stored data [24]. A typ-
ical example of opportunistic crowdsensing is CrowdSense@Place, an application that 
opportunistically capture images and audio clips from smartphones in order to classify 
places into a variety of categories such as store, restaurant, etc. [26]. However, in partici-
patory sensing, the active involvement of device custodians is required and it is often the 
case that most community and urban sensing initiatives are participatory in nature [25].
Lastly, based on those to whom crowdsensed data is shared, both opportunistic and 
participatory sensing can be further subdivided into three categories namely personal, 
social and public sensing [27]. Personal sensing involves personal monitoring and focuses 
on vital information such as daily life patterns and physical activities, social contacts and 
personal location, health vitals (e.g. heart rate, blood pressure and sugar level), etc. [24]. 
By aggregating data from different personal sensing activities, it is possible to detect pat-
terns in physical and health outcomes in a given group or community. When an individ-
ual shares social information gathered from personal sensing activities with friends or 
other members of a social group or community, the process is referred to as social sens-
ing [24]. On a broader scale, when mobile crowdsensing data (e.g. environmental, traffic, 
safety, or security related data) is shared with everyone for public good, the process is 
referred to as public sensing [24].
Mobile Crowdsensing








sensing   
Social 
sensing  
Fig. 1 The different types of mobile crowdsensing
Page 6 of 31Ogie  Hum. Cent. Comput. Inf. Sci.  (2016) 6:24 
Types of incentive mechanisms
Broadly two types of incentives can be used in mobile crowdsensing applications namely 
monetary incentives and non-monetary incentives as shown in Fig. 2 and described in the 
following subsections.
Monetary incentives
Monetary incentives are the real money or any other financial commodity such as virtual 
cash, redeemable credit, etc. that the users consider valuable [28]. Depending on who 
sets the price for a sensing task, monetary incentives can be either platform-centric or 
user-centric [28]. In the platform-centric model, sometimes referred to as crowdsourcer-
centric incentive mechanism [29], the initiator of the sensing task sets the price and aims 
to maximize the platform’s profit [30]. In the user-centric model, the reverse is the case 
as the price is defined by the participants [30]. Furthermore, the platform-centric and 
user-centric models can either operate as static or dynamic incentive mechanisms. In 
static incentive, the price for a task is estimated in advance and stays the same whereas 
in dynamic incentive, the price changes based on the minimum amount of money a par-
ticipant is willing to accept to do the task [31]. In addition to participants’ preference, 
incentives for mobile crowdsensing can also be designed to dynamically change depend-
ing on factors such as the time of day, number of available participants, location and 
type of data captured as demonstrated in a participation-aware incentive mechanism 
known as SenseUtil [32, 33]. Similarly, Biswas et al. [34] proposed PISCES, a closed-loop 
incentive framework that considers the sensing demand and changing availability and 
reporting behaviour of participants in order to compute rewards that dynamically con-
verge to a minimum value after several trials.






Entertainment incentive   
Incentive Mechanism
Monetary incentive 
Fig. 2 The different types of incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing
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Non‑monetary incentives
Non-monetary incentives are rewards which do not involve money or financial com-
modities. In broad terms, non-monetary incentives can be divided into three categories 
namely entertainment, service, and social incentives.
Entertainment incentives
Entertainment incentives cover rewards that motivate users based on interestingness 
(i.e., where users are willing to participate because they think the task is interesting and 
important) and enjoyment (i.e., where users find the task entertaining and enjoyable, e.g. 
game). Entertainment incentives such as gamification often work better in certain types 
of mobile crowdsensing applications, particularly those involving environment monitor-
ing and location services [1]. The idea of gamification is to make the crowdsensing task 
as entertaining and engaging as possible so that users meticulously perform tasks that 
would ordinarily be challenging [28]. The use of games as incentive in mobile crowd-
sensing has certain drawbacks that need to be adequately addressed in future research. 
For instance, how can user-generated metadata from gaming be better managed to pre-
serve privacy? How can the difficult task of designing games for incentivising users in 
mobile crowdsensing be simplified in order to increase applications in a wide range of 
crowdsensing contexts? Similarly, how can complicated or boring crowdsensing tasks 
be turned into a game that is actually enjoyable or fun to play? There is also need for 
research to develop standardised approach for quantitatively measuring the effect of 
gamification on mobile crowdsensing systems [28].
Social incentives
The use of social incentives in mobile crowdsensing applications is based on the idea 
that people could be motivated to participate in sensing tasks for social and ethical rea-
sons [1]. Typical factors that drive social incentives include the need to socialise with 
others, reputation and social recognition [1]. People may sometimes engage in mobile 
crowdsensing tasks due to the good feeling they derive from doing that. This is called 
altruism [31]. Other factors that drive social incentive include mental satisfaction 
derived as result of engaging in crowdsensing tasks, self-esteem and love of the com-
munity in which a crowdsensed task is being performed [28]. For example, CachedSens-
ing is a game-based incentive built on the principles of geocaching, wherein service 
providers interested in monitoring the environment write sensing tasks on NFC tags, 
hide the tags, and publish their coordinates, with the intention of exploring the altruistic 
nature and the spirit of competition between users who go searching and performing the 
defined sensing tasks [35]. Another example of social incentive mechanism is social trust 
assisted reciprocity (STAR) [36, 37]. STAR exploits the synergistic marriage of social 
trust, which is an important aspect of social relationship, and the reciprocity to stim-
ulate mobile crowdsensing [36, 37]. Such incentive models are suited for community-
based sensing where strong social ties exist and people are motivated to contribute to a 
common good. Jaimes et al. [38] describe such motivation to contribute to social good 
as collective incentives. Social psychological factors can also be used as non-monetary 
incentive mechanism to promote mobile crowdsensing activities. In this sense, some 
people may engage better with crowdsensing tasks when there is someone else watching 
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and facilitating the process than when they are alone [28]. Just like gamification, there 
is also need for research to develop standardised approach for quantitatively measuring 
the effect of these social incentive factors on mobile crowdsensing systems [28].
Service incentives
Service incentive is a non-monetary reward system wherein participants in mobile 
crowdsensing systems are asked to contribute sensed data in return for service usage 
[1]. Such service may be one that is offered using the aggregated crowdsensed data as 
demonstrated in [39–41]. In other cases, a service that provides utility to a broad gamut 
of society is used as incentive, not one that necessarily derives its value from the crowd-
sensed data. For example, a telecommunication provider could offer users services such 
as free texting, free calls, mobile internet data, discounts, etc. in order to motivate them 
to contribute sensed data to be utilised for market research or network improvement 
purpose [42]. However, this type of incentive suffers certain limitations. For example, 
mobile phone users that are not within the service area might not be inclined to partici-
pate. There might also be a problem of poor area coverage when users of the given ser-
vice are not uniformly distributed across the area of interest for data capture.
Conceptual framework
Mobile crowdsensing applications are of no value if they are not adequately used by the 
crowd to sense phenomena of interest. The fact that today’s mobile crowdsensing appli-
cations rarely scale up to more than 1000 participants is an issue of concern, particu-
larly for densely populated urban areas [3]. Based on synthesis of relevant literature, this 
section presents a SPECTRUM of factors that broadly covers the various aspects that 
should be considered before adopting or designing incentive mechanisms for mobile 
crowdsensing applications. SPECTRUM is an acronym for a number of factors, i.e., 
socioeconomic factors, privacy, effort, commercial-interest, term, requirements, useful-
ness, and money, which are described in the following subsections and represented dia-
grammatically in Fig. 3. It is envisaged that the concept of SPECTRUM will help shape 
thoughts and decision making related to improving the use and adoption of mobile 
crowdsensing applications. It can also help to facilitate understanding and highlight 
areas where additional actions can be taken to improve participation in existing mobile 
crowdsensing applications.
Socioeconomic factors
In adopting an incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing applications, it is impor-
tant to consider the social and economic makeup of participants in the target com-
munity. From an economic perspective, people are more inclined to participate in 
crowdsensing if they perceive that the outcome will improve their economic status. From 
a social perspective, mobile users are considered to have social goals, values and rela-
tionships that strongly influence their behaviour to participate in crowdsensing activities 
[37, 43, 44]. These values and goals vary from one individual to another. For some it is a 
desire for cleaner and safer cities [10]; for others it is the need to socialise, gain reputa-
tion, or receive the recognition of their community [1]. Understanding people’s social 
values is therefore an important step towards adopting the most appropriate incentive 
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to motivate them to engage actively in mobile crowdsensing. This view is consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. [45, 46]) which have shown that citizens’ sociodemographic char-
acteristics influence their participation in city-wide urban development initiatives.
In addition, Wu and Luo [8] have also highlighted the need for incorporating socioec-
onomic factors into the design and implementation of incentives for citizen engagement 
in civic service. Such socioeconomic factors can sometimes influence and lead to prefer-
ence for certain types of incentive mechanisms. For example, if a community is mainly 
dominated by students and low income earners, the preference for monetary incentive is 
easily justified in terms of efficiency and veracity compared to if the community mem-
bers were predominately people of affluence and enviable socioeconomic status. Simi-
larly, Talasila et al. [47] noted that for a social category and age group that is young and 
vibrant, gamification stands out as a powerful incentive that can be used to motivate a 
small number of participants to cover the mapping of a large region with sensor read-
ings. In addition, social recognition incentives that make participants feel appreciated 
and their contributions valuable are considered to be key priorities in cases where peo-
ple’s interest to participate in civic service have been negatively affected by their poor 
socioeconomic status and the resultant low self-esteem [48]. It is therefore important 
to consider socioeconomic factors and to characterise participants into different social 
groups or networks based on demographic composition, values, ties and motives in 
order to accurately adopt an incentive that is most appropriate for each group.
Privacy
Privacy is an important factor that should be considered when adopting incentives to 
facilitate participation in mobile crowdsensing. The privacy issue associated with mobile 
crowdsensing applications arises from the potential to incidentally collect sensitive data 
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Fig. 3 Diagrammatical representation of SPECTRUM
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aggregates sensed data in large-scale run the risk of accidental leakage of personal infor-
mation such as sensitive images and health-related outcomes [2, 49]. RFID sensor tags 
in wearable devices can be used to uniquely identify and track users [50]. GPS sensor 
readings can reveal sensitive information about an individual’s daily commutes, includ-
ing routes to home and work locations [25]. Understandably, people are sensitive to how 
sensor data is captured and utilised, and would be reluctant to contribute to crowdsens-
ing campaigns if they are not reasonably convinced that their privacy will be adequately 
protected in the process [51]. Service providers are also aware that the breach of pri-
vacy protection legislation can attract significant compliance liability in most organised 
societies [52]. As a result, privacy-preserving mechanisms that ensure personal informa-
tion cannot be gleaned from mined patterns have become key priority requirements in 
designing incentives for mobile crowdsensing [1].
Several of such privacy-preserving mechanisms have been proposed in the litera-
ture. For example, anonymization and pseudonymity are popular privacy-preserving 
mechanisms, which obscure personally identifying information in sensed data [53]. The 
limitation though, is that anonymization leads to false perception of privacy protec-
tion because the use of reverse address lookup technique on GPS sensor readings can 
still reveal frequently visited locations of individuals and therefore derive their personal 
details [25, 53]. This issue of location-based privacy is mostly addressed by mechanisms 
based on k-anonymity [53]. The idea behind k-anonymity is to build groups of k partici-
pants that share a common attribute (e.g., k participants living in the same neighbour-
hood), such that it becomes difficult to distinguish one from another [53]. In addition, 
privacy-preserving mechanisms based on cryptographic techniques have been sug-
gested, but such solutions lead to high energy consumption and scalability is often an 
issue [25]. Similarly, perturbation based approaches, which carefully add artificial noise 
(e.g. Gaussian noise) to sensed data in a manner that does not affect the accuracy of 
statistical trend has been proposed as one of the viable solutions for preserving user 
privacy in mobile crowdsensing applications [25, 53]. These aforementioned privacy-
preserving mechanisms as well as other privacy-aware sensing model and architecture 
already described extensively by Khan et al. [24] (e.g. Secure SocialAware, SmokeScreen, 
and Prisense) provide real opportunities to address privacy concerns and improve the 
efficacy of different types of incentive schemes used for facilitating large-scale mobile 
crowdsensing campaigns.
However, given that these privacy-preserving mechanisms can sometimes incur sig-
nificant implementation overhead, it is important to understand the triad relation-
ship between the nature of the sensing task, privacy criticality and the different types 
of incentive mechanisms in order to adopt the most appropriate incentive for motivat-
ing data contributors. Gustarini et al. [54] demonstrated that the nature of sensing task 
can influence participants concern about privacy and therefore the type of incentive 
required. For example, sensing tasks that allow citizens to provide evidence for pros-
ecuting criminals require high level of privacy to ensure the safety of participants, par-
ticularly when the underlying incentives are purely social (e.g. desire for safer cities). 
The Boston Marathon bombing, wherein tens of thousands of images and videos were 
contributed by citizens for analysis, presents a real-world experience to substantiate the 
above example [55]. However, if monetary incentive was to be used instead in the Boston 
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Marathon bombing case, privacy preservation or anonymization becomes really diffi-
cult, particularly because of the need to accurately identify and reward users who have 
contributed relevant data. Krontiris and Maisonneuve [56] describe this phenomenon 
as the tension between social translucence and privacy. For similar reason to accurately 
identify and incentivise citizens with monetary rewards, the CityZen crowdsensing solu-
tion requires registration and authentication of users, potentially minimising the level 
of privacy protection anonymous participants would otherwise enjoy [57]. In this sense, 
an inverse relationship between privacy and monetary reward can be gleaned i.e. the 
higher the money involved, the greater the need to collect personally identifiable infor-
mation of participants and hence, the lesser the privacy. This is further supported by 
evidence from a previous study [58] suggesting that money can quickly incentivise peo-
ple to forgo their privacy. More specifically, the study found that people are willing to 
provide sensitive information about themselves for as low as 1 Euro [58]. Understanding 
how the criticality of privacy changes with different sensing tasks and with the use of dif-
ferent incentives is therefore important when adopting incentive mechanisms for mobile 
crowdsensing initiatives.
Effort
In designing an appropriate incentive scheme for mobile crowdsensing applications, it 
is important to consider the anticipated effort required by the user to perform the sens-
ing tasks. This is crucial because failing to offer incentives that are worth performing 
the sensing tasks can lead to poor adoption of mobile crowdsensing systems [1]. One 
can think of effort in terms of the time and resources (e.g. network bandwidth, mem-
ory, CPU, battery usage etc.) consumed in performing sensing tasks [10]. Occasion-
ally, other indirect costs (e.g. the cost of travelling to a specified sensing location) may 
also be incurred [59]. The effort required in performing sensing tasks varies as different 
crowdsensing practices place varying demands on users’ mobile devices. For instance, 
piggyback crowdsensing, wherein the tasks of capturing and uploading sensed data are 
performed in parallel with phone calls, helps to save energy consumption on partici-
pants’ mobile devices [60–62]. Whereas, peer-to-peer (P2P) mobile crowdsensing that 
allows storage and computational functions to be performed on user devices, tend to 
consume more resources in participant’s gadgets [63]. Depending on the sensing tasks, 
each participant will incur varying level of direct and indirect costs. Hence, accurately 
estimating the appropriate effort required for each participant and monitoring how that 
will change with time and context is vital in order to efficiently incentivise citizens to 
actively engage in mobile crowdsensing. Gao et al. [64] reported that rewarding partici-
pants according to their actual contributions is more likely to result in increased partici-
pation compared to a strategy that pays a blanket amount to all data contributors. Based 
on observations of previous studies, they noted that offering more rewards does not 
necessarily translate to an overall increase in total aggregated data received if the same 
amount of reward is paid to all participants [64]. This implies that the “one-size fits all” 
reward mechanism is not a robust option and more intelligent approaches that consider 
the actual effort of data contributors are required. In designing incentive mechanisms 
to reward the actual effort of participants, consideration is sometimes given to the work 
done in introducing or recruiting new users into the crowdsensing system [65]. The 
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adoption of this type of incentive mechanism by the winning team of the 2009 DARPA 
Red Balloon Challenge, i.e., the team from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, clearly 
demonstrates its effectiveness [66]. Such reward mechanisms, often known as geometric 
incentive schemes, compensate users with additional passive incentive or a proportion 
of the rewards earned by participants they introduced/recruited to the crowdsensing 
system and those of every other participant that has joined under that referral tree [65]. 
However, the free riding behaviour of participants who earn large passive rewards means 
that the huge number of individuals recruited through geometric incentive mechanisms 
does not always translate to a proportionate effort and the budget required to compen-
sate participants can be quite high [65].
Based on available budget, Angelopoulos et al. [67–69] recommend several strategies 
to reward the effort of data contributors in mobile crowdsensing, including proportional 
incentive policy, participation-aware incentive policy, behavioural-aware incentive pol-
icy, location-aware incentive policy, mobility-aware incentive policy, thrifty incentive 
policy and quality-aware incentive policy. Proportional incentive policy advocates that 
for each task segment, incentive proportionate to the expected utility and the current 
residual budget be allocated, from which the effort of participants who have contrib-
uted data to the task segment can be rewarded accordingly [69]. Participation-aware 
incentive policy recommends that the efforts of data contributors be initially rewarded 
with high incentives in order to stimulate the crowd and attract a minimum percent-
age of participating agents [67]. Afterwards, the efforts of data contributors should be 
rewarded in a more conservative manner that is good enough to retain` existing par-
ticipants, not necessarily attracting new ones [69]. Behavioural-aware incentive policy 
rewards participants based on historical records of their trustworthiness and commit-
ment to the crowdsensing initiative [68]. Location-aware incentive policy selects par-
ticipants by virtue of their locations or rewards participant’s effort according to the cost 
associated with the given location where data is captured while mobility-aware incentive 
policy rewards participant’s effort according to the frequency with which the user moves 
around the area of interest to capture data [68, 70]. Thrifty incentive policy aims at 
rewarding participants in such a way that ensures available budget is used prudently and 
resourcefully. Quality-aware incentive policy seeks to reward the efforts of participants 
in a manner that is proportionate to the quality of data contributed. The rationale for the 
quality-aware incentive policy is to attract high quality participants by offering higher 
amounts of incentive [67]. However, Jin et al. [71] and Wang et al. [72] propose quality-
aware incentive mechanisms (QIMs) that strike a balance between quality and cost of 
data. These QIMs, which are based on reverse auctions, do not reward participants on 
the basis of just the quality of their data, but rather optimise the selection of participants 
by taking into consideration both the quality and the price of their data [71, 72].
The amount and type of incentive to be adopted can also depend on the nature of the 
sensing task [47]. The underlying assumption is that tasks that are more difficult and 
demanding would require greater effort and therefore higher amounts of incentive. In 
principle, monetary incentives are considered to be more suitable for sensing tasks that 
require significant manual effort while gamification is more appropriate when the sens-
ing task does not have tight time constraints and its requirement can be easily translated 
into an enjoyable game action [47].
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Commercial interest
With the rapid growth in the Internet of Things and the advancement in big data and 
cloud-based technologies, combined with the increasing sensing and processing power 
of ubiquitous mobile devices, the concept of sensing as a service has emerged to fully 
maximise the commercial opportunities in mobile crowdsensing [73, 74]. In this regard, 
mobile crowdsensing has been described as a new business model, wherein the sensing 
platforms are designed to be profit-oriented, e.g., [75–77] and the difference between the 
value derived from the crowdsensing based services i.e. sensing revenue and the total 
rewards paid to participants i.e. sensing cost [78], is the service provider’s profit, not tak-
ing into account other operating costs [9, 79]. However, as observed with the traditional 
crowdsourcing market, the maturing of the commercialisation of mobile crowdsensing 
applications can potentially cause users’ expectations about incentives to shift signifi-
cantly towards monetary rewards. Typically, one would expect that users’ motives and 
rationalisation for participation will be driven by the desire to have a share in the profit 
generated from the business venture. Hence, in adopting a suitable incentive mechanism 
for a crowdsensing initiative, it is important to consider that the presence of commer-
cial-interest can cause a bias towards monetary incentives. Commercial interest as dis-
cussed here does not refer to profit made through advertisement in the platform but 
rather focuses on income that directly accrues from the use of the collected data.
Term
In designing incentives for mobile crowdsensing applications, an important factor that is 
often ignored is term. Term, otherwise referred to as shelf life, is the period for which the 
crowdsensing initiative is intended to last [80]. Some crowdsensing applications, by vir-
tue of the purpose they serve are only active seasonally, e.g., the PetaJakarta system used 
during the monsoon seasons for crowdsensing flood conditions in Jakarta [81]. Other 
crowdsensing applications may operate in short term, e.g., a one-off initiative, some-
times lasting just few hours [82] or long term basis [64, 83]. Sun [84] and Sun et al. [85] 
noted that it is important to consider the term when designing profitable and sustain-
able incentive mechanisms for mobile crowdsensing. The incentive mechanisms to keep 
participants in the crowdsensing loop on long-term basis are more complicated than 
those required for short term sensing activities [64]. For example, in long-term or ongo-
ing sensing campaigns, users may find the sensing tasks repetitive and boring over time. 
Incentives may become undervalued or inadequate as a result of significant improve-
ment to the socio-economic conditions of participants. In addition, Salim and Haque 
[86] noted that when participation in mobile crowdsensing is required for a long term, 
incentives are considered to be highly relevant compared to when it is for short term.
Similarly, Gao et al. [64] noted that short-term sensing incentive may not sufficiently 
guarantee the long-term continuous participations of users. This is usually the case when 
the receipt of the short term incentive is irregular in the long term. For instance, if a user 
observes that the receipt of an acceptable incentive has suddenly become irregular due 
to low success rate in an auction based incentive mechanism, the user may lose interest 
and eventually drop out of the sensing loop [64]. One solution to this problem though 
is an incentive mechanism that automatically lowers the bids of users who were unsuc-
cessful in the previous round of auction, in order to increase their chances of winning in 
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future auction rounds [64]. Similarly, Nan et al. [87] and Guo et al. [88] recommend pay-
ing well-performed losers a minimal amount that is encouraging enough to keep them in 
the sensing loop.
Furthermore, the duration of a sensing task plays an important role in determining the 
most appropriate incentive mechanism to adopt [47]. For long term sensing tasks, the 
gaming approach is considered not suitable because the game design for strong in-game 
incentives to keep players engaged over a long time is extremely difficult and in many 
cases defiling the essence of the sensing task [47, 89]. For such long term sensing efforts 
(e.g., 1  year) where gamification cannot continuously sustain participants’ motivation, 
it is speculated that monetary incentives would be more effective because man’s want 
for money is insatiable [47, 89]. Money is a strong influence on people and still remains 
the most appropriate incentive for crowdsensing tasks that impose tight constraints on 
participants, including strict timing of sensing event [47]. Monetary incentives should 
therefore be prioritised over social and entertainment incentives when it is crucial to 
quickly lure citizens into participating in sensing tasks that have strict timing require-
ment [47].
Requirements
Requirements as defined here refer to the specification of the mobile crowdsensing 
application in terms of quality, quantity, and area coverage. Reddy et al. [90] highlighted 
these three factors as the key performance metrics of any mobile crowdsensing system. 
Every mobile crowdsensing initiative is unique and the requirements in terms of quality, 
quantity, and area coverage vary. Hence, in order to adopt the most appropriate incen-
tive to help attain the specific requirements of the sensing tasks, it is important to under-
stand which type of incentive mechanism works best for each of these factors, i.e., area 
coverage, quality and quantity of crowdsensed data. This can be a challenging task, espe-
cially when the associated cost or affordability of the incentive mechanism is taken into 
consideration. Zhang et al. [91] relate to this as the “4A” requirements, which are afford-
ability, accuracy (i.e. quality), availability (i.e. coverage) and adequacy (i.e. quantity). The 
need to satisfy these requirements is driving new crowdsensing paradigms, including the 
concept of sparse mobile crowdsensing [92]. Sparse mobile crowdsensing, which aims to 
reduce the overall sensing cost without compromise of data quality, functions by allocat-
ing sensing tasks for only a small portion of the target area to be covered while inferring 
the data of the remaining unsensed area based on the spatial and temporal correlation 
among the data captured from different sub-areas [92]. An obvious limitation of sparse 
mobile crowdsensing is that it may not be ideal for applications in which data quantity is 
as important as data quality.
The quantity of crowdsensed data can be increased in many ways, including mon-
etary rewards and gamification incentives [93]. In using monetary reward to increase 
the quantity of crowdsensed data, Sarma et al. [94] recommend that the budget be opti-
mally split, such that one portion is allocated to advertisement targeted at attracting par-
ticipants while the remaining portion is used for actual compensation of participants’ 
effort. The basic assumption behind the use of monetary incentives for increasing the 
quantity of crowdsensed data is that participants are motivated by the desire to increase 
financial gains and so tend to engage more in crowdsensing activities [1]. This strategy 
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of rewarding participants according to their level of contribution is described by Sarma 
et  al. [94] as proportional incentive, which is different from equal incentive where the 
same amount is paid to all participants irrespective of the quantity of data contributed 
[94]. The downside of proportional incentive is that the desire to gain more money may 
cause some participants to contribute fake data as evidenced in a recent experimental 
study where monetary reward was used to incentivise citizens [47]. The results of the 
study show that though the quantity of data received increased by 15 %, there were also 
plenty of fake data submitted mostly by the top 20 high earners [47]. For this reason, 
gamification is sometimes used instead as a viable incentive for increasing the quantity 
of data in mobile crowdsensing [93]. When used as an incentive, gamification can help 
to motivate users to increase the quantity of data contributed, both in terms of diversity 
and amount of data [8].
Data quality in mobile crowdsensing can also be increased by both monetary rewards 
and gamification incentives [93]. A recent study by Talasila et al. [47] demonstrated that 
by increasing the monetary reward assigned to crowdsensing tasks, the quality can also 
be improved. Sun and Ma [95, 96] and Micholia et  al. [97] show how improvement to 
the quality of crowdsensed data can be achieved while still constraining the monetary 
incentive mechanism to work with a fixed budget. In improving the efficacy of monetary 
incentives as means of enhancing data quality, Guo et al. [89] proposed several strategies 
implemented in TaskMe, including dynamic budgeting, data quality evaluation metrics 
(e.g. completion ratio, quality indicator), competitive worker selection and quality check 
that occur after users complete tasks and submit their data along with bid price, and a 
multi-payment system that rewards not just the winner, but also a few high ranking los-
ers as determined by available budget. Importantly, this strategy of competitively selecting 
workers at the completion of tasks can potentially eliminate the issue of uncertainty about 
the eventual participation and contributions of users as discussed in [98]. Furthermore, 
Kawajiri et  al. [93] demonstrated that the quality of crowdsensed data can be directly 
increased through gamification. This is an important step forward from the traditional idea 
of indirectly improving the quality of data by increasing the quantity [93]. Few other stud-
ies that have used gamification in urban-scale crowdsensing initiatives include [98, 99].
In most urban-scale crowdsensing initiatives, area coverage is a major requirement, 
which if not adequately addressed can undermine the robustness of the system. The 
problem of area coverage occurs when the regions of interest have geographically unbal-
anced number of participants (i.e., plenty of participants in some areas and little or 
none in others) or when the data of interest have geographically unbalanced prices (i.e., 
very expensive in some areas and cheap in others) [45]. Based on analysis results from 
a recent study, Talasila et al. [47] suggest that gaming is the most appropriate incentive 
for attaining uniform area coverage because it is a cost-effective solution that has great 
potential to motivate participants to capture data from both popular and unpopular 
regions. Example of such mobile crowdsensing solutions designed based on gamification 
incentives to achieve fast and efficient area coverage are Alien vs. Mobile User and Crowd 
Soft Control proposed in [100] and [101] respectively. Nevertheless, Albers et al. [102] 
opine that the use of monetary incentives such as location-dependent coupons that are 
only redeemable in a certain part of a city (i.e., target area) can effectively steer users to 
collect data from the target area. Similarly, Mendez and Labrador [103] proposed the 
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concept of density maps to generate the number of participants and the locations that 
should be covered in the data collection exercise so that incentive mechanisms can be 
properly oriented to satisfy the crowdsensing requirements in a cost effective manner.
Usefulness
Usefulness relates to the purpose for which the crowdsensed data is being collected. The 
usefulness of a crowdsensing initiative has an inherent ability to positively or negatively 
influence user participation. If the usefulness of the crowdsensing campaign is consid-
ered a public good and has a broader appeal and relevance to the target community, 
people will be more inclined to participate based on ordinary social incentives. Typi-
cal crowdsensing activities that appeal to the broader community include those related 
to public safety and security [1]. For example, the city-scale participation in the Peta-
Jakarta.org system, a mobile crowdsensing solution used for producing open, real-time 
situational overview of flood conditions in Jakarta is mostly driven by users’ motiva-
tion to contribute to public good and safer communities [81]. In rare situations where 
the crowdsensing initiative is highly useful and provides unique benefits or opportuni-
ties to the participants (e.g., submission of auditioning videos for actor/actress roles), 
a reverse incentive scheme, in which the participants pay the service provider instead, 
may be adopted as demonstrated with the crowdsensing application known as Medusa 
[104]. Similarly, when the crowdsensing application is considered very useful to partici-
pants, Tomasic et al. [105] show that simple incentives such as the quid pro quo (QPQ) 
approach can be effective. The QPQ approach reminds users to contribute data without 
which they are denied access to the system [105]. QPQ is ideal for highly useful crowd-
sensing applications and it is again the basis for the incentive adopted in [106]. Impor-
tantly, Tham and Luo [107] noted that such highly useful crowdsensing applications, in 
which users are both contributors and consumers of service, require deeper investiga-
tion of issues bothering on social welfare and fairness of incentive mechanisms. Con-
versely, when the purpose of a crowdsensing initiative does not appeal to the broader 
community, a stronger incentive such as monetary reward is required to be provided by 
the service provider in order to sufficiently motivate users to participate in sensing data. 
It is therefore important to consider the usefulness of the crowdsensing initiative when 
deciding on the most appropriate incentive for a crowdsensing campaign.
Money
Money refers to the financial budget and other resources available for implementing the 
crowdsensing project. From an economic standpoint, it is important to carefully con-
sider the available resources, including financial and non-financial assets such as techno-
logical infrastructure, human resources, skillsets etc. and adopt the most economically 
viable incentive mechanism that would yield maximum pay-off from the crowd [67]. 
Depending on the scale of the sensing campaign, monetary rewards can be far more 
costly than social and game incentives because of the payments involved [108]. Hence, 
when the available fund for the crowdsensing project is little and impracticable for moti-
vating large-scale participation, monetary incentives should be discouraged and social 
ones adopted where feasible.
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Adoption of incentive mechanisms in real‑world mobile crowdsensing 
applications
Numerous incentive mechanisms (e.g. [11–16]) have been proposed in the literature, but 
not many of them have been applied in real-world crowdsensing applications. Viewed 
with the lens of SPECTRUM, Table 1 shows how a combination of factors could influ-
ence the choice of incentive used in real-world mobile crowdsensing applications. The 
real-world mobile crowdsensing applications listed are those which have specifically 
considered incentive options for motivating participants. Crowdsensing initiatives that 
collect data on an ongoing basis are classified as long term. Examples include NoiseMap 
[111], NoiseTube [112] and NoiseSPY [113] that collect data on an ongoing basis in 
order to monitor noise pollution in the urban environment.
In Table 1, the classification of privacy and effort into “high”, “low”, or “moderate” is 
based on the nature of crowdsensing task. Tasks that have high likelihood of personal 
information been exposed are considered to have high privacy risk. Similarly, tasks that 
demand greater usage of network bandwidth, memory, CPU, battery, personal time and 
participant’s skills are considered to require high effort. Furthermore, when compared 
with evidence from literature, it is observed that only an insignificant number of real-
world crowdsensing applications have discussed money or budget as a constraining 
factor in adopting incentive mechanism. However, from an economic standpoint to min-
imise cost, it can be assumed that the role of money or budget as a constraining factor in 
adopting incentive mechanism is implied.
From Table 1, it can be seen that most real-world mobile crowdsensing applications 
prioritise the adoption of non-monetary incentives such as social, service and entertain-
ment (e.g. gamification) incentives over monetary ones. This is usually the case (e.g. [109, 
111–113, 116, 117]) when the crowdsensing initiative is considered useful to the gen-
eral public and participants’ socioeconomic needs can be met in the process. However, 
except for Waze [110] that provides strong social incentives, it is observed that when 
the crowdsensing initiative is motivated by a commercial or business interest to make 
financial profit (e.g. [114, 115]), monetary incentive is often used instead to reward par-
ticipants. These opt for monetary incentive is justified, considering that users’ motives 
and rationalisation for participation may be influenced by the desire to have a share in 
the profit generated from the business venture.
Applying SPECTRUM in real world: the case of PetaJakarta
Using the PetaJakarta system as a case study, this section presents an exemplary dis-
cussion of how the concept of SPECTRUM (i.e., socioeconomic factors, privacy, effort, 
commercial-interest, term, requirements, usefulness, and money) can be applied in 
adopting the most appropriate type of incentive mechanism for real-world crowdsensing 
applications. The PetaJakarta system is selected for this discussion based on the author’s 
experience and familiarity from working on the project. The PetaJakarta system is a 
crowdsensing application that harnesses the power of social media and the ubiquitous 
nature of mobile devices to gather, sort, and generate real-time maps of flood conditions 
in various parts of coastal mega-cities such as Jakarta, Indonesia [81]. Developed by the 
SMART Infrastructure Facility of the University of Wollongong, Australia in collabora-
tion with the Jakarta Emergency Service (well known as BPBD DKI Jakarta) and Twitter 
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Inc., the PetaJakarta system relies on citizens with mobile devices to report the locations 
of flood events by posting geotagged “tweets”, preferably with an embedded image and 
text description of flood conditions (e.g. water height) in their localities [81]. Based on 
the aggregated geo-located tweet data, a publicly accessible city-scale map of real-time 
flood conditions is generated, thereby facilitating swift assessment, emergency response 
and management of flood hazards [81]. Interestingly, this system has been deployed in 
the city of Jakarta without explicit recourse to any viable mechanism for incentivising 
citizens. Hence, the steady dwindling of tweet reports from citizens has put the discus-
sion around a potential incentive mechanism on the front burner of priority research 
challenges. Here, the role of SPECTRUM in guiding that decision to select an appropri-
ate incentive mechanism is discussed.
Socioeconomic factors constitute an important element of SPECTRUM. In the con-
text of Jakarta, a densely populated city with many underprivileged citizens seeking to 
improve their economic well-being [119], one would think that low-priced monetary 
incentive will be effective in motivating people to engage in the crowdsensing process. 
However, given the terrain in which citizens are expected to collect data, i.e., flood 
conditions, there is a tendency that the use of monetary incentives will strongly influ-
ence the urban poor struggling to acquire enough earnings for daily survival to engage 
dangerously with flood hazards, potentially creating ethical and legal risks for the ser-
vice provider. Similarly, gamification has entertaining and strong influences on people 
and one can hardly justify the appropriateness or rationality in engaging citizens with 
games while flood disasters unfold, with risk of harm to people’s property and loved 
ones. Nonetheless, when the social perspective is taken into consideration, a unique 
opportunity emerges- the citizens of Jakarta have strong social values as reflected in 
their engagement with social networks and are rated the “biggest tweeting” city in the 
world [120]. Many Jakarta citizens already share values in (safely) exchanging real-time 
flood information using social media. These social values combined with altruism and 
the desire for a safer city have so far contributed to some meaningful activities in the 
PetaJakarta system. It is therefore important that the introduction of a concrete incen-
tive mechanism reinforces these social values, not destroy them as a monetary incen-
tive could potentially do when introduced [28]. On the basis of socioeconomic factors, a 
well-designed social incentive, which poses no ethical and legal concerns is considered a 
better option than monetary or gamification rewards.
Privacy is the second element in SPECTRUM. In the context of Jakarta, privacy con-
cerns exist, particularly for the urban poor living in informal settlements or slums situ-
ated along the watersides [119]. These people may be reluctant to contribute geo-located 
tweets because of fear that they will be traced by the government and punished for liv-
ing in illegal settlements. Though money can quickly incentivise people to forgo their 
privacy [58], the issues raised above with monetary incentives remain a concern in that 
context. Rather, it is argued that societal recognition of slum dwellers and their role in 
community building be strongly emphasised in PetaJakarta campaigns and endorsed by 
government authorities as an aspect of social incentive to motivate contributions from 
the millions of Jakarta’s citizens residing in slums. Anonymity should also be encouraged 
as possibly permitted through the twitter user account.
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In terms of effort, tweeting can be considered “effortless” and enjoyable for active users 
of social media. However, to compensate for the resources consumed on user devices, 
outstanding contributors should be identified and given social incentives such as com-
munity recognitions and awards. These awards or prizes could include coupons, which 
are still safer than traditional monetary incentives that pay a price for each relevant data 
contributed.
When commercial interest as an element of SPECTRUM is considered, the ground 
for monetary incentive is again weak in the case of PetaJakarta because the system is not 
profit-driven or designed with the intention to make economic returns. Citizens’ expec-
tation of monetary rewards is therefore low in such a system that is designed for com-
mon good. A social or collective incentive is considered more appropriate in this case to 
motivate citizens to contribute to social good [38]. With regards to term as a component 
of SPECTRUM, the PetaJakarta system is used seasonally in Jakarta during the annual 
monsoon period, typically between November and March [121]. The period between 
each consecutive monsoon season provides sufficient time to instigate or rekindle citi-
zens’ motivations for data contribution by embarking on social programmes for flood 
preparedness, including campaigns and advertisements for PetaJakarta, community rec-
ognition and celebration of citizens who were outstanding in their contributions during 
the last crowdsensing regime.
Requirement as an element of SPECTRUM refers to the quality, quantity and area cov-
erage needs of the crowdsensing system. These three factors are vital for the success of 
the PetaJakarta system, but the quality of tweets (e.g. accuracy of GPS location, quality of 
embedded image, etc.) is most important for decision making. A fair and well-designed 
social incentive scheme that highlights and recognises outstanding contributors based 
on the quality and quantity of data submitted is an important step in the right direction. 
Admittedly, area coverage is better addressed with gamification or monetary incentives 
and social rewards will have very limited effect. To address area coverage in PetaJakarta, 
a social incentive can be complemented with the concept of sparse mobile crowdsens-
ing [92], previously discussed in “Requirements” section, by inferring missing data from 
poorly sensed areas based on the spatial and temporal correlation among the data cap-
tured from areas that are adequately covered.
Usefulness is a key element of SPECTRUM, which influences the type of incentive that 
should be adopted for mobile crowdsensing. PetaJakarta finds its usefulness in improv-
ing public safety from flood hazards and can be considered a public good, with broader 
appeal and relevance to the citizens of Jakarta. Citizens would therefore be inclined to 
participate in the use of PetaJakarta, based on social incentives that encourage altruistic 
behaviours and the desire for safer communities. Furthermore, money as an element of 
SPECTRUM is a key factor that determines if monetary incentive is appropriate for a 
crowdsensing initiative or not. In Jakarta, the shortage of funding and the meagre budget 
available for disaster management demands that low cost approaches such as social 
incentives be adopted for incentivising data contributors to the PetaJakarta project 
[119]. In a nut shell, by consideration the various elements in SPECTRUM in relation 
to the unique context of the PetaJakarta system, one can infer that social incentives are 
most appropriate for motivating citizens of Jakarta to participant in the crowdsensing 
process. Other real world application scenarios may present their unique characteristics 
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and constraints, but SPECTRUM will still be found useful in shaping thoughts and guid-
ing decision making to adopt the most appropriate incentive scheme. More importantly, 
the use of SPECTRUM would ensure that decision makers do not miss out on any of 
the key factors that would influence the choice of incentive mechanism for their specific 
mobile crowdsensing initiative.
Discussions
This study has presented the concept of SPECTRUM to represent the range of fac-
tors, namely socioeconomic factors, privacy, effort, term, requirements, usefulness 
and money, that should be carefully considered in order to adopt the most appropriate 
incentive for mobile crowdsensing applications. The intuitive premise behind the con-
cept of SPECTRUM is that decision makers can make more robust decisions that con-
sider exhaustively the key factors that significantly influence the choice of incentive for 
motivating large-scale participation in mobile crowdsensing. When considered together, 
these factors presented in “Conceptual framework” section and represented diagram-
matically in Fig. 3 do not prescribe any particular type of incentive, but rather give deci-
sion makers sufficient information to make more balanced and robust decisions based 
on how each of the factors relate to the crowdsensing context and any specific objectives.
Although SPECTRUM is a conceptual framework, the factors upon which it is estab-
lished have been strongly recommended as key attributes influencing the choice of 
incentives in mobile crowdsensing [47, 108]. For instance, Talasila et  al. [47] recom-
mend that the designers of mobile crowdsensing systems consider key factors such as 
the desired spatio-temporal properties of the data (i.e. accounting for area coverage and 
timing requirements), the level of data reliability required (i.e. accounting for quality 
and quantity requirements), the monetary cost, the user privacy, the user effort and the 
resource consumption on mobile devices. They added that going forward, all these fac-
tors need to be considered by designers when building systems and choosing an appro-
priate incentive for a particular crowdsensing situation [47]. Similarly, Zaman et al. [108] 
recommend that when determining the reward for participants in mobile crowdsens-
ing, several factors should be considered including, spatio-temporal characteristic of the 
event (i.e. again accounting for area coverage and timing requirements), privacy valua-
tion, fairness (i.e. accounting for users’ effort in terms of adequacy of reward), purpose 
of sensed data (i.e. addressing usefulness) etc. The concept of SPECTRUM addresses all 
of the aforementioned factors. It is hoped that by proposing the concept of SPECTRUM 
and highlighting the state of knowledge in relation to the outlined factors, the ground-
work is laid for empirical investigation into how various factors may influence the type 
of incentive mechanism that is considered most appropriate for any given crowdsensing 
task.
In terms of practical implication, the outlined conceptual framework, i.e., SPEC-
TRUM, can enable urban computing professionals and researchers consider a broader 
range of factors and consequently adopt the most appropriate incentive mechanism to 
attain large scale participation and citizen engagement in mobile crowdsensing. This 
implies that cities can get smarter and better equipped to develop new intelligence in 
monitoring, understanding and responding to a wide range of urban problems.
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Research opportunities and challenges
With the introduction of the outlined conceptual framework come new research oppor-
tunities and challenges that need to be further investigated in order to fully explore the 
potential of SPECTRUM in improving citizen participation in mobile crowdsensing. 
While the adoption of the most appropriate type of incentive as facilitated by SPEC-
TRUM is a crucial step towards improving citizen participation in mobile crowdsens-
ing, actual engagement of participants will also depend strongly on whether the right 
incentive has been properly designed and implemented. Hence, in highlighting research 
challenges and areas where further studies are needed to improve citizen participation 
in mobile crowdsensing, it is important to consider design and implementation issues 
relevant to the different factors outlined in the concept of SPECTRUM.
For a start, the concept of human grouping which has emerged as a way to simplify the 
process of understanding and utilising socioeconomic factors in selecting an appropri-
ate incentive is yet to be fully explored in the context of mobile crowdsensing [1]. The 
idea behind human grouping, for purpose of designing effective incentive mechanisms, 
is that participants in each group will share similar social and economic goals, different 
from other groups and hence would be motivated differently. The importance of incor-
porating human grouping into mobile crowdsensing, a process described by Lane [122] 
as community-aware sensing, has been emphasised in several studies, including [123, 
124]. GroupMe, proposed in [124] is a giant stride in this direction to help facilitate the 
discovery of groups within mobile crowdsensing systems. However, several research 
challenges still need to be adequately addressed in order to fully maximise the potential 
of using human grouping to improve the outcomes of decision making related to appro-
priateness of incentive mechanism. A typical example is how to accurately design robust 
solutions to automatically identify and characterize mobile users into virtual communi-
ties and social networks in a way that is both dynamic and privacy-friendly.
Privacy is a reoccurring term in mobile crowdsensing research and also the second 
factor in the concept of SPECTRUM. As earlier highlighted in this study, a key prior-
ity requirement that must be considered when designing incentives for mobile crowd-
sensing is the need for privacy-preserving mechanisms that ensure personal information 
cannot be gleaned from mined patterns [1]. Unfortunately, the design of privacy-pre-
serving mechanisms is hampered by the fact that there is a trade-off between privacy 
guarantees and sensing fidelity [53]. The enforcement of privacy-preserving measures 
often degrades the quality of sensed data, thus also potentially decreasing its utility [30]. 
Worse still, individual perception of privacy and data sensitivity varies and strongly 
depends on socio-cultural and contextual differences ‐ factors that are difficult to accu-
rately measure in urban scale [53]. Furthermore, privacy of mobile crowdsensing sys-
tems is still in its infancy and requirements may vary slightly depending on the area of 
application [24]. For example, in designing crowdsensing applications for use in emer-
gency conditions, there may be additional requirement to allow the specified privacy 
settings to be overridden when necessary (e.g. by paramedics or doctors). These factors 
combine to make the design of privacy-preserving mechanisms difficult. Further stud-
ies that demonstrate how privacy-preserving mechanisms can be incorporated into the 
design of different types of mobile crowdsensing incentives are therefore required.
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In the context of monetary incentives, several privacy-friendly solutions have emerged 
upon which future studies can build. For example, APISENSE is a mobile crowdsensing 
application based on monetary incentive that enforces user privacy by allowing partici-
pants to control access to the sensors on their mobile devices. The user chooses whether 
to participate or not depending on the perceived threat to privacy. In return, the system 
rewards the user with redeemable credit based on the quantity and quality of data con-
tributed [30]. The reward system is a weighted approach that allocates more credit to 
sensors that are more privacy-invading [30]. The user therefore enjoys the flexibility to 
disable some of the sensors for privacy reasons. This solution is quite useful because it 
gives a fair chance to both the users that are profit-driven and those that are privacy-
conscious to maximise the outcome of their participation in a way that does not appear 
exploitative. In a similar monetary incentive scheme based on reverse auction mecha-
nism, users’ privacy was guaranteed by enabling them to bid and claim their reward 
anonymously, while at the same time ensuring high quality output is delivered [125]. 
These aforementioned privacy-friendly solutions, as well as other existing privacy-aware 
monetary incentive systems [e.g. 126–128] provide real opportunities and the founda-
tion knowledge upon which future studies can expand.
Monetary incentive and its relationship with the quality of crowdsensed data is 
another key area that needs to be further investigated in order to fully explore the poten-
tial of SPECTRUM in improving citizen participation in mobile crowdsensing. It is 
argued that once money is involved in crowdsensing, the participants are more likely to 
deceive or cheat the system to increase financial gains [1]. Such cheating might involve 
the submission of fake data. The situation is further complicated when one considers the 
distributed nature of participants [28]. Participants are likely to submit sensing data of 
diverse quality due to difference in their spatial–temporal contexts and personal effort 
levels [9]. There is even strong evidence that monetary incentives do not affect quality of 
work, but rather merely affect the number of times a worker is willing to do a task [28]. 
This position is in contradiction to a recent study by Talasila et al. [47] demonstrating 
that by increasing the monetary reward assigned to crowdsensing tasks, the quality can 
also be improved. This situation calls for further studies to empirically investigate the 
relationship between monetary incentives and the quality of crowdsensed data.
In terms of implementation, another challenge associated with quality requirement is 
how to design a relevant incentive mechanism that facilitates honest and efficient con-
tributions and also avoids unnecessary rewards to low quality crowdsensed data [1]. In 
other words, the key issue is how to technically estimate the quality of sensing data with-
out pre-existing knowledge of the specific sensing behaviour of each participating user 
and the corresponding ground truth information at the time of data capture to indepen-
dently verify the correctness of the data [9]. This area of research is still grossly under-
investigated and only a few studies exist. For example, by extending the well-known 
Expectation Maximization algorithm that combines Bayesian inference and maximum 
likelihood estimation to determine the quality of crowdsensed data, and further applying 
the classical Information Theory to quantify the effectiveness of crowdsensed data, Peng 
et al. [9] inferred fair and proper rewards for participants using the estimated values of 
quality and contribution. However, a major limitation of the abovementioned solution is 
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the lack of a standardised approach based on which both participants and service pro-
viders can accurately estimate cost of participation.
Determining the right amount that participants expect to receive for their efforts in 
contributing crowdsensed data is a complex challenge. Typically, the expectation of each 
contributor is different and their opinion on the perceived cost of their participation var-
ies, depending on personal judgement of resource utilisation and the unique context or 
current situation they are involved in at the time [112]. Accurately estimating the appro-
priate amount for each participant and monitoring how that will change with time and 
context is an increasingly difficult task that requires deeper investigation [129]. A com-
mon practice is to avoid this problem of estimating the expected amount for reward-
ing participants’ efforts by using the reverse auctions technique, where the need for the 
requester to set or guess a reasonable amount for users is eliminated and the participants 
are allowed to set the amount themselves [125, 130]. For example, Koutsopoulos [14] 
proposed an incentive mechanism based on a reverse auction model that uses a negotia-
tion process to reduce sensing cost while ensuring the quality of sensed data. However, 
an inherent limitation of this approach is that time-delays from the underlying negotia-
tion process may degrade the purpose for which the data is collected, particularly if the 
data is meant to serve a real-time solution such as weather forecasting, urban parking, 
etc. [93]. Users might also find the negotiation process too cumbersome [93]. Further 
research is required to thoroughly address these challenges.
Another issue associated with rewarding the effort of participants is that which may 
occur if the ease of the sensing task renders the participation cost low and as a result, 
the reward amount is also fixed low. It has been demonstrated that the number of users 
participating in crowdsensing initiatives reduces when tasks are split into subtasks of 
lower rewards [131, 132]. In this case, even though the reward amount might be deemed 
appropriate based on the participation cost, motivation to participate will still be weak 
if the number of sensing tasks to which a participant is engaged is not large enough to 
amount to a significant sum [93]. Future research in monetary incentives needs to pro-
vide for this kind of scenario when considering the effort of participants.
Furthermore, it is important to consider that in certain situations the reward amount 
attached to a crowdsensing task cannot sufficiently motivate some participants, par-
ticularly if they are driven by intrinsic motivations and not necessarily financial gains. 
Anawar and Yahya [133] noted that the interpretation of incentives in crowdsensing 
literature is still loose, mostly focusing on monetary incentives and poorly address-
ing situations in which participants are mostly driven by intrinsic motivation, which is 
also known as the “third drive”. In such situations where reward amount is not a factor, 
the use of monetary incentives may destroy pre-existing intrinsic motivations in a pro-
cess known as “crowding out” [28]. Crowding out can also occur when the situation is 
reversed i.e. when some users expect monetary reward in a scheme that only promotes 
social rewards. A conventional approach to minimising the problem of crowding out is 
to use hybrid incentive mechanisms that combine both monetary and non-monetary 
reward models. For example, Jaimes et al. [31] recommend a combination of monetary 
rewards and other types of incentives such as intrinsic and social-based incentives, etc. 
in order to increase user participation. CityZen is a crowdsensing platform for citizen 
engagement in smart city management that incentivises participants with monetary 
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rewards, civic recognitions and discounted tickets to zoos, museums, etc. [57]. Simi-
larly, QuaCentive is a quality-aware incentive framework for mobile crowdsensing, 
implemented by appropriately integrating one monetary (i.e. reverse auction) and two 
non-monetary (i.e. reputation and gamification) incentive mechanisms [28]. The NAIST 
Photo participatory sensing system proposed by Ueyama et al. [134] also provides option 
for a combination of monetary and gamification incentives. To sum it up, D’Hondt et al. 
[135] express their conviction that large-scale crowdsensing can be achieved through an 
incentive scheme that carefully balances altruism with a form of direct or indirect remu-
neration, not necessarily of monetary nature.
With the complexities and implementation overhead associated with monetary incen-
tives, there are possibilities that some of today’s mobile crowdsensing systems running 
on monetary incentives will be translated or complemented with non-monetary incen-
tives in the future, e.g., increased social recognition and other task-related awards issued 
by hosting communities [10]. The robustness and sustainable use of such socio-technical 
systems driven by hybrid incentive mechanisms will depend on the ability to understand 
and resolve potential issues bothering on ethics and fairness [136]. Hence, there is need 
for a deeper investigation into the implications of allowing both monetary and non-
monetary incentive mechanisms to co-exist and be used concurrently to reward partici-
pants in the same mobile crowdsensing system.
Mobile crowdsensing initiatives that have strict area coverage requirements can also 
pose significant challenges when the adopted incentive must be designed in such a way 
as to steer participants contribution towards meeting the specific requirements [31]. A 
few studies (e.g. [31, 93]) have proposed incentive mechanisms that aim to address the 
problem of poor data capture in some areas and data redundancies in others. Prominent 
amongst these solutions is SPREAD, a monetary incentive designed to select the lowest 
cost participants that are best distributed spatially to cover the area of interest within a 
defined budget [31]. This implementation is based on a combination of the Greedy Set 
Cover algorithm, the Weighted Variance Maximization algorithm and the well-known 
Reverse Auction Dynamic Price with Recruitment (RADP-VPC-RC) mechanism [31]. 
Similarly, the concept of “steered crowdsensing” has been proposed as a viable solu-
tion to address the issue of poor area coverage. In this approach, different redeemable 
credit points are assigned to various locations and users motivated by these incentives 
can choose to make it to the locations of interest to capture data samples [93]. While the 
aforementioned solutions have made significant research contributions, further studies 
are required to address the problem of poor area coverage along various directions, such 
as the use of mobility profiles as one of the selection criteria when recruiting partici-
pants [65]; recruiting participants with high demographic diversity [66]; increasing the 
coverage area by understanding the mobility patterns of different groups [67]; involving 
participants with broad and diverse social interaction patterns [68]; and the use of den-
sity maps to estimate the number of participants in a given area [25]. It is also important 
to investigate the problem of poor area coverage from the perspective of unequal rep-
resentation of various community stakeholders and interest groups in the participatory 
sensing process and how that influences the fairness and reliability of the crowdsensed 
data for urban decision making.
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Conclusion
The design and selection of an appropriate incentive mechanism is critical to the success 
of any mobile crowdsensing initiative. This study has offered the concept of SPECTRUM 
as a comprehensive guide for inferring the most appropriate type of incentive suited to 
the unique characteristics or requirements of any given crowdsensing task. No doubt, 
the broad range of factors covered in SPECTRUM will enable smart cities to efficiently 
incentivise users and improve participation in large-scale crowdsensing applications. 
Furthermore, the paper has highlighted research challenges and areas where additional 
studies related to different factors outlined in the concept of SPECTRUM are needed 
to improve citizen participation in mobile crowdsensing. One limitation of this study 
is that the proposed concept of SPECTRUM is short of concrete realization through 
empirical validation. Future studies will therefore seek to empirically validate the signifi-
cance of each factor covered in SPECTRUM in the context of different types of mobile 
crowdsensing activities and incentive mechanisms.
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